Immigration Law Unlocked

His Son’s I-130 Was Approved. The Removal Order Was Almost Twenty Years Old.

When an attorney calls me about an approved I-130 and a client with a removal order, my first question is usually, “When was this removal order issued?”

In one case I worked on as a consultant to the father’s attorney, the answer was almost twenty years ago. His adult son, a U.S. citizen, had filed an I-130 for him. As I remember it, the petition had already been approved when we filed the motion to reopen. The attorney saw a potential path to a green card. I could see it, too. But we still had to answer the question the judge would face. What grounds did we have to reopen this case after all those years?

What the father thought he had agreed to

The part of the case that changed my assessment came out when I spoke with the father.

The old order granted him voluntary departure, with an alternate order of removal. He told me his attorney at the time had said he could stay in the United States and appeal. He said he kept asking other attorneys for help. He said it was only in 2023, when his current attorney explained the old order to him, that he understood what he had agreed to. He told me he would never have agreed to voluntary departure if he’d understood then what it meant.

That was why I wanted the judge to look at equitable tolling first. An ordinary motion to reopen is generally due within 90 days of the final order, and we were far past that.1 His son’s petition could show the judge what reopening might allow him to pursue. The explanation for the delay had to come from the father. The deadline, forum and adjustment evidence are in my filing guide for reopening on a family petition.

Tolling and ineffective assistance are separate questions. Here the same facts went to both. Tolling isn’t in the statute. It comes from circuit law, so whether it’s available and what you have to show depend on where the case sits. For us it meant asking the judge to excuse the late filing, and we had to explain what had kept him from filing sooner and what he had done to pursue his case. Ineffective assistance is the claim about former counsel’s advice, and it has its own requirements under Matter of Lozada.2 We notified former counsel and raised that claim.

We went back through what he could remember. Whom had he seen? When? Which office? What had he paid? What had he asked? What answer had he taken home? His affidavit identified two attorneys and described years of consultations. I don’t remember the details of any one consultation well enough to say what we verified. I remember what we asked. The motion made other arguments as well, including a request that the judge reopen on the court’s own motion.

The judge granted our motion and reopened the case.

“But the approval is new”

I hear that a lot, usually on calls where the petition has already been approved. I’d say, yes, it changes what the client might qualify for. But what changed was his personal situation. Nothing changed back in his country.

An approved I-130 can be new evidence, but it doesn’t change the deadline. It also doesn’t fit the changed-country-conditions exception, which belongs to protection claims. That exception covers a motion to apply for asylum or withholding of removal, based on changed conditions in the country of nationality or the country of removal, with material evidence that wasn’t available at the earlier proceeding and wouldn’t have been discovered or presented there.3

When the approval is an SIJ petition

This part is not the father’s case. It’s a different call I get, and it comes from more than one matter.

An attorney has a young client with an approved I-360 for Special Immigrant Juvenile classification and an old removal order. Sometimes the child was included in a parent’s case, appeared in court, and was ordered removed. Sometimes the order was entered after a missed hearing. I want to know which one happened. If the child missed court, what notice was given for that hearing? What kept the child from being there? Those answers tell counsel whether there’s a basis to look at rescinding the order. Lack of notice can be raised at any time. Exceptional circumstances carries a 180-day deadline.4

I also want to know what the young person has lived through. In separate matters, I’ve worked on cases involving children who had suffered abuse, and the proceedings were reopened. I can’t tell you why those cases were reopened. Where there are serious humanitarian circumstances, I ask counsel to examine them carefully and to consider preserving a supported request that the judge reopen on the court’s own motion. The regulation gives an immigration judge that authority in a case the judge decided, unless jurisdiction sits with the Board.5 It’s discretionary, and nobody is entitled to it.

Families also deserve to understand how narrow that possibility is. In Matter of Z-R-C-N-, a mother and her minor daughters filed a late motion to reopen with the Board. The daughters had approved SIJ petitions. The Board looked at the Visa Bulletin it had in front of it, found a four-year gap between their priority date and the date then current, and called their eligibility to adjust speculative. It then declined to reopen on its own motion, citing its rule that this authority is for “truly exceptional situations.”6

I use that case with two cautions. The four-year gap was the Board’s finding on that record, from the December 2025 bulletin. It isn’t a wait-time estimate for a client today, so counsel checks the current bulletin. And the refusal to reopen on its own motion was the Board’s discretion, on a motion filed with the Board.7 A judge who still has the case makes a separate call on a supported request. I still wouldn’t promise anything.

What I’d want the family to hear

Sometimes, after working through the file, the grounds aren’t there. The answers are usually way more narrow than we imagine.

Then what I’d want the attorney to tell the family is that the SIJ approval matters. It gives them a potential path to a green card, but the removal order is still there. And I’d tell the attorney that, based on what we found in the file, I don’t see grounds to reopen right now, and I wouldn’t give the family false hope.

I’d rather the family hear that plainly.

Footnotes

  1. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). ↩

  2. Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988). ↩

  3. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ↩

  4. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). ↩

  5. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). ↩

  6. Matter of Z-R-C-N-, 29 I&N Dec. 523, 523–24, 526–27 (BIA 2026) (quoting Matter of G-D-). ↩

  7. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ↩