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Lack-of-notice motion to reopen
Read §§ 3.1–3.3 of the lack-of-notice chapter: purpose, threshold screening, and strategic risk assessment, followed by Section 2 of the October 2026 Supplement on returned hearing notices. The Foreword, complete Table of Contents, and Part Two opener are included, with an additional Lozada excerpt below.
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- The book’s preliminary pages — copyright & disclaimer, currency of authorities (September 15, 2026), and permitted use
- The Foreword by the Hon. Marna M. Rusher (Ret.), former Immigration Judge, U.S. Department of Justice
- The complete Table of Contents, exactly as it appears in the current manuscript
- The Part Two opener, with the seven-part structure used in Chapters 3 through 8, and §§ 3.1–3.3 of In Absentia Motion to Reopen (Lack of Notice) — seven selected pages through the strategic risk assessment and its six red flags, with the manuscript’s own typography, citations, footnotes, and practice notes
- Section 2 of the October 2026 Supplement, “Returned hearing notices and practicable follow-up” (pages S-3–S-6), covering Meza Medina v. Blanche andMatter of Chamorro Castillo
The author, Julio Costa, LL.M., is a Brazilian attorney and legal consultant who has drafted more than 160 motions to reopen and prepared more than 60 appellate briefs for proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals, working with U.S. immigration attorneys and law firms. He is licensed to practice law in Brazil and is not admitted to practice law in any jurisdiction of the United States.
A selected excerpt, not the complete chapter. The portion of § 3.4 that shares the final page is omitted; all footnotes to §§ 3.1–3.3 are retained.
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An accessible text edition of the selected reading, the Foreword, the Part Two opener and §§ 3.1–3.3 of Chapter 3 and Section 2 of the October 2026 Supplement, followed by the additional Lozada excerpt (§§ 5.1–5.3), for screen readers and search. The page images above show the passage in the book’s own typography; footnotes are collected at the end with the manual’s numbering.
FOREWORD
The EOIR Motion to Reopen Practice Manual
There are few things more gratifying to a lawyer than watching a colleague whom you have had the privilege of mentoring develop professionally and, ultimately, become a teacher to others.
I have had the pleasure of knowing and working with Julio Costa, and I have watched firsthand his development in immigration law. It is therefore with particular pride that I write this foreword to The EOIR Motion to Reopen Practice Manual.
A motion to reopen is among the most important—and often most challenging—tools available to an immigration practitioner. It can provide a critical opportunity to correct an error, present evidence that was not previously available, or bring a case back before the Immigration Court when circumstances demand it. Yet the practice is highly technical. Success often depends not merely upon recognizing that a motion to reopen may be available, but upon understanding the governing law, identifying the appropriate procedural vehicle, developing the evidentiary record, and presenting the argument in a manner that addresses each of the requirements that the adjudicator must consider. Julio's manual brings all of these elements together.
What distinguishes this work is its exceptional attention to detail. Julio does not simply describe the law governing motions to reopen. He provides practitioners with something far more valuable: a practical roadmap. He takes what can seem like a complicated and sometimes daunting area of immigration practice and organizes it into a thoughtful, logical, and usable framework.
For the practitioner preparing a motion to reopen, that organization matters. A successful filing requires discipline. It requires the attorney to ask the right questions, identify the relevant authority, anticipate potential obstacles, develop the necessary facts and evidence, and present the case in a coherent and persuasive manner. This manual provides a framework for doing precisely that.
I am particularly pleased to see Julio's experience translated into a resource that can benefit other attorneys. The best practice manuals are not merely compilations of statutes, regulations, and case law. They reflect the judgment that comes from extensive experience working through the difficult questions that arise in actual cases. Julio has brought that practical perspective to this book.
For those who practice before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, this manual should become a valuable part of the practitioner's library. Whether you are an experienced immigration attorney looking to refine your approach or a newer practitioner learning how to navigate the motion-to-reopen process, you will find here a detailed and carefully constructed guide.
I highly recommend The EOIR Motion to Reopen Practice Manual to immigration practitioners. Although the main thrust of this book is for defense counsel, it will prove to be equally valuable to Department of Homeland Security prosecutors and immigration judges. It is a thoughtful, exceptionally detailed, and practical resource.
The Hon. Marna M. Rusher (Ret.)
Former Immigration Judge, U.S. Department of Justice
Former Assistant Chief Counsel, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
PART TWO — THE MOTIONS
Part Two applies the governing rules to each motion-to-reopen ground addressed in this Manual. Each chapter is designed to serve as the primary working document for that motion type, with cross-references to Chapter 2 where the underlying legal framework applies.
Before using Part Two, confirm the reopening grounds identified through the Decision Tree in Chapter 1, jurisdiction (§ 2.2), and the applicable deadlines (§ 2.3). Use the relevant Part Two chapters to prepare the ground-specific showing. Before filing, complete the Pre-Filing Assembly Checklist (Appendix A), returning to Chapter 1 if the grounds or procedural posture require reassessment.
Chapters:
- Chapter 3 — In Absentia Motion to Reopen (Improper / Defective Notice)
- Chapter 4 — In Absentia Motion to Reopen (Exceptional Circumstances)
- Chapter 5 — Motion to Reopen Based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
- Chapter 6 — VAWA-Based Motions to Reopen
- Chapter 7 — General Motion to Reopen Based on New & Material Evidence
- Chapter 8 — Sua Sponte Motion to Reopen
- Chapter 9 — Calderón Jiménez JMTRD (Time-Limited Class Action Settlement Framework)
Chapter Structure:
Chapters 3 through 8 use the same seven-part structure listed below. Chapter 9 instead uses a settlement-specific organization reflecting its time-limited class-action framework.
- (1) Purpose of the Motion — What this motion does and its legal basis
- (2) Threshold Screening — Requirements and screening questions for the applicable route
- (3) Strategic Risk Assessment — Red flags that counsel against filing even when the gates are met
- (4) Required Documents and Evidence — Organized checklist grouped by function
- (5) Affidavit Guidance — What to include and what to avoid in the respondent’s affidavit
- (6) Common Failure Points — How an otherwise-viable motion is lost to errors in preparing and presenting it
- (7) Strategic Notes — Circuit splits, timing considerations, and edge cases
The common structure helps practitioners assign drafting tasks and check each motion for required components.
Chapter 3 excerpt — Lack of Notice
Sections 3.1–3.3, reproduced from the final publication manuscript, printed pages 56–62. The start of § 3.4 on the final page is omitted.
Chapter 3 — IN ABSENTIA MOTION TO REOPEN (LACK OF NOTICE)
3.1 PURPOSE OF THE MOTION
A motion to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal order based on lack of notice is a statutory mechanism under INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) for vacating removal orders entered where the respondent did not receive notice of the hearing as required by law.197 The statute authorizes rescission “at any time” — there is no filing deadline — upon a demonstration that the respondent did not receive the notice that resulted in the in absentia order. Unlike standard motions to reopen, rescission under this provision does not involve discretionary balancing — the adjudicator does not weigh equities or require a showing of eligibility for underlying relief. But the respondent still bears the evidentiary burden of demonstrating non-receipt — adjudicators evaluate credibility, corroboration, and diligence under the M-R-A- framework (see § 3.2.iv) before finding the statutory showing has been made.
Subject to the permissible-mailing and address-forfeiture rules in § 3.2 and the circumstances in which the respondent can be charged with receipt under § 3.3, the dispositive question is whether the respondent or counsel of record received the notice that resulted in the in absentia order. Courts distinguish that receipt inquiry from compliance with mailing formalities.198 The motion corrects entry of a removal order without the notice required by law. It does not exist to remedy technical defects in charging documents or to reopen proceedings for the pursuit of new relief.
Recent Supreme Court precedent has sharpened this inquiry. In Campos-Chaves v. Garland, the Court held that a defective Notice to Appear does not, standing alone, require rescission where the respondent received a valid Notice of Hearing under INA § 239(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2), specifying the time and place of the missed hearing.199 The BIA applied Campos-Chaves in Matter of Laparra-Deleon, 29 I&N Dec. 389 (BIA 2026), holding
that NTA defects provide no basis for rescission under INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) when the respondent received a compliant hearing notice.200 Where the record contains a compliant hearing notice under INA § 239(a)(2), a lack-of-notice argument must target non-receipt of that hearing notice — not antecedent NTA defects.
PRACTICE NOTE: After Campos-Chaves, and the BIA’s application in Laparra-Deleon, NTA-only challenges to in absentia orders are foreclosed where the respondent received a valid hearing notice under INA § 239(a)(2). Direct the lack-of-notice argument to non-receipt of the hearing notice that resulted in removal — not to defects in the initial NTA.
3.2 THRESHOLD SCREENING: WHEN THIS MOTION APPLIES
In removal proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) permits only one motion to rescind, even though a lack-of-notice motion has no filing deadline. Review prior motions and § 2.4.2 before filing. Legacy deportation and exclusion orders follow different provisions; identify the proceeding type before applying the removal rules in this chapter. To succeed, the respondent must satisfy the following notice-related gates:
i. Non-Receipt of Operative Hearing Notice DHS bears the initial burden of establishing notice sufficient to support an in absentia order.201 The respondent, in turn, must demonstrate non-receipt of the operative hearing notice, addressing notice to counsel of record as well as to the respondent and any applicable address-forfeiture rule. Proper issuance or mailing does not by itself establish actual receipt. Evaluate credible evidence of non-receipt together with notice to counsel and any applicable address-forfeiture rule.202
ii. Addresses Provided and Address Forfeiture The Board held in Matter of Diji that DHS may serve an NTA by regular mail at the most recent address the respondent provided, including one provided before the NTA was issued, and that written notice mailed to that address is sufficient for an in absentia order under INA § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Prior receipt of the NTA and its
address advisals is not a prerequisite to using that address. Moving does not, by itself, make the last address provided legally defective.203 Diji overruled Matter of G-Y-R-, the Board’s rule on this question for nearly twenty-five years; § 3.7.5 below discusses that history and how to preserve a challenge. Separately, INA § 240(b)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B), dispenses with written notice when the respondent fails to provide the address required by INA § 239(a)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F). Determine whether that no-notice provision applies under controlling circuit law. Mailing to a qualifying address does not establish every prerequisite for an in absentia order, does not by itself establish statutory forfeiture, and does not conclusively prove receipt.204
For each notice, identify the most recent address actually supplied before mailing and compare it with the address used. Record the date, method, receiving government component, and proof of each submission to DHS, including USCIS or ICE, and to EOIR. Residence history alone does not establish those submissions. A newer address actually supplied, or an address misrecorded by the government, requires a different analysis from a move never reported. Do not assume that notice to one component updates every agency or court record; apply the filing-stage and circuit rules discussed below.
DHS registration and address-reporting duties exist apart from the NTA advisals. They help explain why DHS may already have an address before removal proceedings begin. Compliance with those duties does not replace a required EOIR address filing, and a failure to update DHS does not automatically authorize an in absentia order without the remaining statutory prerequisites.205
iii. Presumption of Delivery After Mailing to the Proper Address If notice was mailed to the proper address under the rules above, assess the presumption of delivery and the evidence of non-receipt. Prior receipt of the NTA advisals is not a separate prerequisite to that mailing inquiry under Diji. Keep this question distinct from statutory forfeiture, which can eliminate the obligation to send written notice. Where the receipt
inquiry remains available, apply the M-R-A- framework below. Where the respondent moved without reporting the new address, assess the actual submission history, any government recording or mailing error, available receipt evidence, and any applicable circuit-law or constitutional theory before choosing the grounds to plead.206
iv. Rebuttable Presumption of Delivery Can Be Overcome. When the government properly addresses a hearing notice and mails it according to normal office procedures, a presumption of delivery attaches. The strength of that presumption depends on the method of service, and the BIA requires adjudicators to consider all relevant evidence in evaluating whether the respondent has rebutted it.207 The BIA’s companion case, Matter of C-R-C-, applies the same framework and reinforces its analytical structure.208 Circuit courts have followed suit.209
The following five evidence categories organize that inquiry; they are not an exhaustive or mandatory test:
i. Method of service. Certified mail with a signed return receipt creates a strong presumption of delivery. Regular mail — the government’s default method — produces a weaker one that is more readily overcome by credible evidence of non-receipt.
ii. Credible sworn statement of non-receipt. Provide a sworn affidavit clearly explaining non-receipt of the hearing notice and the facts supporting that account (see § 3.5 for drafting guidance). iii. Corroborating circumstantial evidence. Documentary and testimonial evidence supporting the non-receipt claim — proof of residence, mail monitoring records, household member affidavits, delivery failure evidence, and related documentation (see § 3.4 for the full evidence checklist).
iv. Evidence of incentive to appear. Facts tending to show movant would not have knowingly missed the hearing — prior attendance, pending relief applications, family ties, stable employment (see § 3.4). v. Prompt action upon discovery of the in absentia order. Steps taken after learning of the order — FOIA requests, retaining counsel, ICE check-ins, or filing the motion itself. Significant unexplained delays may weigh against the respondent (see § 3.7.2).
Bare assertions of non-receipt may be insufficient when the complete record does not rebut the applicable presumption.210 Build the record with available corroboration and explain material gaps; regular-mail cases do not impose an inflexible corroboration requirement.
PRACTICE NOTE: Apply the law of the circuit where the case arises. Diji’s rejection of G-Y-R- and Anyelo does not displace controlling circuit holdings. In the Eleventh Circuit, Dragomirescu interpreted the statutory no-notice exception to require receipt of the NTA’s address advisals before an unreported move excuses notice, adopting that reading on its own analysis as well as by deference to G-Y-R-. The respondent there had received the NTA. Preserve the argument that this circuit interpretation controls, and address any contention that the receipt condition was unnecessary to its result. Diji’s discussion of Dominguez concerns its status when the Board decided Anyelo; Dragomirescu later treated Dominguez’s statutory statements as dicta. The Fifth Circuit in Fuentes-Pena held that an address update given to ICE before the NTA was filed with the immigration court satisfied the address duty; it reserved the respondent’s obligations after filing. The Ninth Circuit in Velasquez-Escovar held that a respondent who provided a correct address and never moved was entitled to notice, and that the Board could neither reject her unrebutted account nor defend its decision on a regulatory ground it had not invoked; an alternative strand of its reasoning relied on G-Y-R-. In the Ninth Circuit, government knowledge that its notice effort failed triggers a due-process duty to take additional reasonable steps if practicable; compliance with statutory mailing requirements or failure to update an address does not alone resolve that inquiry. Apply each holding to its facts
and procedural stage rather than treating these decisions as interchangeable exceptions.211
3.3 STRATEGIC RISK ASSESSMENT: WHEN NOT TO FILE
Even where threshold gates are satisfied, do not file if any of the following apply:
RED FLAG 1 — WEAK OR CONFLICTING EVIDENCE OF NON-RECEIPT. Your client’s evidence of non-receipt is internally contradicted by the record — for example, a prior statement or filing acknowledges receipt, contemporaneous evidence shows receipt of the written hearing notice, or documentation conflicts with your client’s stated address history.212 Resolve material contradictions and explain any remaining discrepancies before filing.213 Prior receipt of other government mail at the same address does not itself establish receipt of the disputed notice. Address that evidence as part of the complete delivery record (see § 3.2.iv).214
RED FLAG 2 — DELAYED FILING WITHOUT EXPLANATION AFTER DISCOVERY. The respondent learned of the order years ago, but the record does not explain the delay in filing the motion.215 Prolonged, unexplained inaction after discovery invites adverse inferences that undermine the non-receipt claim216 — delay is one evidentiary factor, not a separate filing deadline.217 (See § 3.7.2 for diligence analysis and mitigation strategies.)
RED FLAG 3 — RELIANCE ON NTA-ONLY ARGUMENTS POST-CAMPOS-CHAVES. The motion rests entirely on Pereira or Niz-Chavez NTA defects without addressing non-receipt of the
hearing notice.218 After Campos-Chaves, this argument fails where a valid hearing notice was received (see § 3.1).219
RED FLAG 4 — NOTICE CHARGED THROUGH AVOIDANCE OR HOUSEHOLD HANDLING. Evidence that the respondent deliberately refused or evaded delivery can defeat a non-receipt claim.220 An unclaimed certified letter does not by itself establish deliberate avoidance; examine the delivery attempts and the respondent’s explanation.221 Separately, when notice reaches the correct address but fails to reach the respondent because of internal household mail handling, the respondent can be charged with receipt. Address who collected the mail and what happened after delivery.222 Assess address failures separately under § 3.2.ii.
RED FLAG 5 — WEAK AFFIDAVIT WITHOUT AVAILABLE CORROBORATION. The motion rests solely on your client’s statement of non-receipt despite available supporting documentation (see § 3.4).223 Obtain available corroboration and explain any material gaps before filing.224
RED FLAG 6 — EQUITY-BASED RATHER THAN STATUTORY ARGUMENTS. The motion emphasizes hardship, family ties, or sympathetic circumstances rather than demonstrated non-receipt under INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii).225 The statute conditions rescission on proof of non-receipt — not on equities or compelling personal circumstances. Reframe or do not file.
Chapter 3 footnotes
197 INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).
198 INA § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (notice to the respondent or counsel of record); Alrefae v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2006) (inquiry focuses on actual receipt of hearing notice, not compliance with mailing procedures); Kozak v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 34, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2007) (same); Derezinski v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
199 Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447, 462 (2024).
200 Laparra-Deleon, 29 I&N Dec. at 390–91.
201 INA § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
202 Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 665, 673–75 & n.3 (BIA 2008) (distinguishing mailing from receipt and preserving counsel-notice and address-duty qualifications).
203 Matter of Diji, 30 I&N Dec. 1, 9–12 (BIA 2026) (en banc), overruling Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 2001). Diji also overrules citation to Matter of Anyelo, 25 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 2010), which applied G-Y-R- in the Eleventh Circuit. Diji, 30 I&N Dec. at 12 n.7.
204 INA § 240(b)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B); see Diji, 30 I&N Dec. at 10, 13–14 & 12 n.7. Applications of the address-forfeiture rule, each involving an NTA served in person, include Spagnol-Bastos v. Garland, 19 F.4th 802, 806 (5th Cir. 2021); Gudiel-Villatoro v. Garland, 40 F.4th 247, 249–50 (5th Cir. 2022); Platero-Rosales v. Garland, 55 F.4th 974, 977 (5th Cir. 2022); Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 40 F.4th 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2022). The circuit-specific limits are addressed in the Practice Note below.
205 Diji, 30 I&N Dec. at 10–11; INA §§ 262, 265, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1305; 8 C.F.R. §§ 265.1, 1003.15(d)(2).
206 See Diji, 30 I&N Dec. at 10–11, 13.
207 M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. at 673–75; Diji, 30 I&N Dec. at 13–14 (applying the weaker regular-mail presumption and evaluating the respondent’s evidentiary record).
208 Matter of C-R-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 677, 679–80 (BIA 2008).
209 E.g., Perez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 788, 795–97 (9th Cir. 2022) (granting the petition and remanding where the agency invoked constructive notice without evaluating the credibility of the non-receipt claim under the M-R-A- framework).
210 See M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. at 674 (rejecting a rigid evidentiary formula and requiring a case-specific assessment).
211 Diji, 30 I&N Dec. at 12 n.7; Dragomirescu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 44 F.4th 1351, 1355–58 & 1356 n.4 (11th Cir. 2022); Dominguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Fuentes-Pena v. Barr, 917 F.3d 827, 830–31 & 831 n.3 (5th Cir. 2019); Velasquez-Escovar v. Holder, 768 F.3d 1000, 1003–06 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th 978, 988–93 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (applying the constitutional notice standard in a collateral attack on a 1994 deportation order and remanding for consideration of practicable additional steps). A constitutional claim remains subject to the procedural and prejudice requirements of the vehicle used.
212 See Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 665, 674 (BIA 2008).
213 See id.
214 See § 3.2.iv (M-R-A- factors for rebutting presumption of delivery).
215 See M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. at 674 (identifying actions after discovery and diligence as relevant evidence).
216 Valadez-Lara v. Barr, 963 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding the agency’s consideration of more than a decade of inaction after discovery as part of the full record).
217 M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. at 674; INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
218 Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021).
219 Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447, 462 (2024); Luna v. Garland, 123 F.4th 775, 779 (5th Cir. 2024).
220 Derezinski v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 619, 621–22 (7th Cir. 2008).
221 Id.
222 Matter of Diji, 30 I&N Dec. 1, 14 (BIA 2026) (en banc); Ojeda-Calderon v. Holder, 726 F.3d 669, 673 (5th Cir. 2013).
223 See § 3.2.iv (M-R-A- corroboration factors).
224 See M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. at 674.
225 INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (rescission predicated on non-receipt of notice, not equitable considerations).
From the October 2026 Supplement, which accompanies every copy. This section updates § 3.2 and § 3.4 following two decisions issued after the Manual’s cutoff.
Returned hearing notices and practicable follow-up
Section 2 of the October 2026 Supplement, pages S-3–S-6. The remainder of the supplement accompanies purchase.
2 RETURNED HEARING NOTICES AND PRACTICABLE FOLLOW-UP
Manual: Chapter 3, § 3.2, pp. 60–61, and § 3.4, pp. 63–64.
Decisions: Meza Medina v. Blanche, Nos. 20-70017 and 24-5144 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2026); Matter of Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. 170 (BIA 2026) — October 22, 2026.
Practical effect. Identify what the government knew when delivery failed and what additional step was available. In the Ninth Circuit, prepare to confront the Board’s restrictive treatment of follow-up while preserving the court’s constitutional notice rule.
A returned hearing notice requires more than identifying the address on the envelope. The Manual already explains that, in the Ninth Circuit, government knowledge that notice failed triggers a duty to take additional reasonable steps when practicable. Meza Medina v. Blanche applies that rule in civil removal proceedings. Matter of Chamorro Castillo accepts its applicability but announces a significant agency limitation where EOIR mailed notice to the only, undisputedly correct address in the record. Read the two decisions together when developing the address history and identifying what further notice effort was available.4
The address record determines the comparison
In Meza Medina, relatives supplied the respondent’s correct residential address on a bond form that asked where he would reside, not where he received mail. He received mail at a P.O. box. The hearing notice was sent to the residential address and returned with a marking indicating there was no mail receptacle; the government made no further attempt. The majority found that the respondent had supplied a mailing address, relying on his sworn statement that he had told the court where to send notices. It identified mailing to that address and calling the telephone number on the bond form as practicable alternatives. The court held that the removal order was improper and the first reopening motion should have been granted.5
The majority’s address finding is important to the holding. The dissent read the declaration differently and concluded that the government had only the residential address. It nevertheless agreed that known failure of delivery required further reasonable steps if practicable, but would have remanded for that factual inquiry. Counsel should therefore identify the actual submission and evidence establishing the alternative address in the
client’s case. The majority’s reading of this record is not a substitute for proving what the client supplied, to whom, and when.6
Chamorro Castillo involved a different record. The respondent’s own reopening evidence confirmed that the hearing notice had been mailed to his correct address, the only available mailing address. A postal employee explained that the mailbox had filled, the mail had been held, and it was returned unclaimed. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s constitutional standard, the Board found no additional reasonably available or practicable step for the Immigration Court to take.7
EOIR’s announced limitation and the circuit argument
The Board’s reasoning extends beyond the absence of another mailing address. It rejected generally imposing telephone follow-up on Immigration Courts, citing their quasi-judicial role, workload, confidentiality concerns, and the risks of ex parte contact. It also distinguished EOIR’s record from the A-file maintained by DHS: the Board and Immigration Judges do not have access to that file, and DHS may hold information not shared with them. The Board stated that it is appropriate for DHS to inform EOIR when it learns of a different address.8
Why the Board’s limitation deserves challenge
Chamorro Castillo gives too much weight to administrative burden and too little to the consequence of proceeding after the government knows its notice failed. A full mailbox does not eliminate the respondent’s responsibilities. It also does not, by itself, explain why further notice efforts would be impracticable. The record included a telephone number. The Board’s concerns about workload, confidentiality, and neutrality deserve consideration, but invoking those concerns generally is not the same as demonstrating that a limited follow-up effort was unavailable in this case.9
The troubling move is from a particular failed mailing to a broad institutional conclusion. The Board’s stated rule treats the absence of another mailing address as resolving the availability of additional steps, even though telephone contact is a different means of reaching the respondent. Its discussion acknowledges that possibility and rejects imposing it generally. That reasoning risks narrowing an inquiry about the practical circumstances of
an individual case into a categorical exemption from further effort. Counsel can challenge that move without claiming that every returned envelope requires a telephone call or that actual receipt is constitutionally guaranteed.10
The Board’s neutrality rationale also deserves scrutiny. It expresses concern that locating a respondent could assist immigration enforcement. Yet the proceeding at issue may itself end in an in absentia removal order. A limited effort to make a hearing notice effective can protect the opportunity to participate. Treating that effort chiefly as an investigative threat leaves the participation interest inadequately addressed. The argument should remain tied to the steps available in the particular record.11
These objections should be developed under governing circuit law. The Board’s institutional reasons do not establish that it overruled the Ninth Circuit. Meza Medina identified a telephone call as an available alternative on its record; Chamorro Castillo rejected a generally imposed EOIR telephone obligation. A motion should address that tension under governing circuit law and identify the concrete additional step asserted to have been practicable. Distinguish an alternative already in the relevant agency’s records from an open-ended search for the respondent. A listed telephone number is relevant to that inquiry, not an automatic entitlement to reopening.12
Keep the grounds and supporting evidence separate
Statutory notice, actual receipt, compliance with address obligations, and constitutional sufficiency remain separate questions. Returned mail may support nonreceipt and establish when the government learned that its attempt failed; it does not alone resolve every statutory or constitutional requirement. Conversely, mailing that satisfies the statute or regulations does not necessarily answer the due-process claim. Chamorro Castillo expressly rejects DHS’s argument that constructive statutory notice ends that inquiry. The Manual’s existing statutory and address analysis, including its treatment of Diji, must still be applied to the particular record.13
For the constitutional argument, use Manual § 3.4, pp. 63–64, and its evidence instructions to assemble a dated account of each address, its source and purpose, the receiving government component, and the submissions made before the disputed mailing. Obtain the returned envelope or delivery record, identify when the failure became known, and explain the proposed next step and why it was practicable. Distinguish the client’s residence from the address actually supplied for mail, and distinguish information held by DHS from information in EOIR’s record. These are record-building recommendations; they do not create a mandatory evidentiary formula.
Rivera-Valdes, already discussed in the Manual, arose in a criminal collateral attack. Meza Medina supplies the civil-removal application. Do not import the criminal requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) into a civil rescission motion; analyze the procedural and prejudice requirements of the vehicle actually used. Part C of the separate Template Change Schedule recommends two precise refinements to T03’s existing parentheticals. For the treatment of declarations, see Supplement § 3, p. S-7.14
Supplement footnotes
4 Meza Medina v. Blanche, Nos. 20-70017, 24-5144, slip op. at 12–17 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2026); Matter of Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. 170, 172–76 (BIA 2026). See Manual pp. 60–61 & n.211.
5 Meza Medina, slip op. at 7–10, 13–17. The majority relied on the respondent’s declaration; it did not identify a separately documented P.O.-box submission.
6 Id. at 17–23 (Desai, J., dissenting).
7 Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. at 170–72, 174–76 & n.3.
8 Id. at 173–76 & n.4.
9 Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. at 170–71, 173–76 (Form I-830 included a telephone number; discussing workload, neutrality, ex parte contact, and confidentiality).
10 Id. at 175–76. Compare Meza Medina, slip op. at 14–17 (discussing known failure of notice and practicable alternatives).
11 Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. at 174–76. The criticism concerns the opinion’s institutional rationale, not a finding that an identified call would necessarily have reached the respondent.
12 Meza Medina, slip op. at 16–17; Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. at 175–76 & nn.3–4. See also United States v. Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th 978, 991–93 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc).
13 Meza Medina, slip op. at 14–15; Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. at 171–72. For the separate statutory/address framework, see Manual § 3.2, including pp. 59–61, and § 3.4, pp. 63–64.
14 Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th at 982–83, 988–93; Meza Medina, slip op. at 12–17; Chamorro Castillo, 30 I&N Dec. at 172. See Manual p. 61 n.211.
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Additional Lozada excerpt — §§ 5.1–5.3
The original ineffective-assistance excerpt remains available here.Download the original Lozada preview (PDF).
Chapter 5 — MOTION TO REOPEN BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
5.1 Purpose of the Motion
A motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel seeks to restore a meaningful opportunity for relief where prior counsel’s deficient performance deprived the respondent of that opportunity. Unlike motions premised on changed circumstances or new evidence, IAC motions challenge the integrity of the underlying proceedings themselves — the claim is that the result cannot stand because the process that produced it was fundamentally compromised by counsel’s incompetence.
An IAC motion ordinarily proceeds under INA § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), together with the applicable reopening regulation — 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 before the Immigration Court, or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 before the Board. For ordinary reopening, the practitioner generally must establish three components, subject to the governing circuit’s standards: (1) deficient performance — counsel’s conduct fell objectively below professional norms; (2) prejudice — the deficiency deprived the respondent of a meaningful opportunity to pursue viable relief; and (3) procedural compliance with Matter of Lozada, which ordinarily requires the respondent’s affidavit describing the agreement and deficiencies, notice to prior counsel with an opportunity to respond, and a disciplinary complaint or an adequate explanation for not filing one. Statutory in absentia rescission and appellate reissuance require the route-specific analysis in § 4.7.1 and § 5.7.4.288
Most circuits ground IAC claims in the Fifth Amendment due process guarantee, though the constitutional footing varies by circuit289; for the circuit-by-circuit treatment, including the Eighth Circuit’s contrary rule, see § 5.3, Red Flag 7, and § 5.7.3, Constitutional Right to Effective Counsel, below.
For treatment of IAC as an exceptional circumstance excusing failure to appear in motions to rescind in absentia orders, see Chapter 4, § 4.7.
5.2 Threshold Screening: When This Ground Applies
Screen the six matters below before drafting. The applicable requirements depend on the relief and procedural route sought; statutory in absentia rescission and appellate reissuance do not simply replicate an ordinary reopening motion.
i. Timeliness or Equitable Tolling.
An ordinary motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days after entry of the final administrative order of removal. Identify the operative order and calculate timely receipt under § 2.3.1; statutory rescission follows its own deadline rules in § 4.2.290 Where the motion is untimely, assess equitable tolling under the governing circuit’s law. To obtain equitable tolling, the movant must show diligent pursuit of the claim and an extraordinary circumstance that stood in the movant’s way and prevented timely filing.291 Courts may review whether established facts satisfy the legal standard for equitable tolling, including diligence. Disputes about what historically occurred remain factual, and reviewability does not eliminate deferential review of primarily factual applications.292 The diligence required is “reasonable diligence,” not “maximum feasible diligence,” assessed in the person’s circumstances over the entire period sought to be tolled, including efforts to discover the error and to act after actual or constructive discovery.
In Matter of Morales-Morales, the BIA overruled Matter of Liadov and held that the 30-day BIA appeal deadline is a claim-processing rule — not jurisdictional — and subject to equitable tolling under the framework of Holland v. Florida.293 For a missed notice of appeal, address the appeal deadline and the extraordinary circumstance that prevented timely filing; this holding concerns Board appeals, not the separate motion-to-reopen deadline.
ii. Lozada Procedural Compliance.
The motion must satisfy Matter of Lozada’s three procedural requirements: (a) a respondent affidavit or declaration complying with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 describing the agreement with prior counsel and the specific deficient acts or omissions; (b) evidence that prior counsel was informed of the allegations and given an opportunity to respond; and (c) proof of a disciplinary complaint filed against prior counsel, or a reasoned, evidence-supported explanation for why no complaint was filed.294 In 2026 the Board made the proof dimension explicit — a motion asserting that a disciplinary complaint was filed must include a copy of the complaint as actually filed together with proof of its filing, or else an explanation why no complaint was filed.295 The threshold varies by circuit — some require strict compliance with each element, others recognize substantial compliance where Lozada’s purposes are otherwise satisfied (see § 5.7.1, Lozada Compliance Standard below).
PRACTICE NOTE: In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron deference, holding that courts must exercise independent judgment rather than defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute. That holding has prompted arguments that Lozada — an agency-created compliance framework — can no longer bind respondents. The Eleventh Circuit’s published opinion in Gutierrez-Mikan rejects the argument, reasoning that Lozada does not rest on the interpretation of an ambiguous INA provision at all; it is an exercise of the BIA’s authority to regulate reopening practice, which Loper Bright leaves untouched.296 Do not build a challenge to Lozada compliance requirements on Loper Bright.
iii. Deficient Performance.
Prior counsel’s conduct must have fallen objectively below minimum standards of professional competence — not a strategic choice the practitioner disagrees with in hindsight.297
Alleged deficiencies include failure to file applications, briefs, or appeals that were due; affirmative misadvice causing the respondent to miss hearings, waive relief, or forego appeals; abandonment of representation without notice; pursuit of legally foreclosed theories while ignoring viable claims; or failure to file an opening brief on appeal, causing dismissal of the petition for review.298 The line between deficient performance and disfavored strategy is addressed in § 5.3, Red Flag 1 (The “Tactical Decision” Defense).
iv. Prejudice.
For ordinary reopening, the Board generally requires a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different; apply the governing circuit’s formulation.299 Prejudice requires demonstrating that counsel’s errors foreclosed a procedurally or substantively viable avenue of relief — not that relief would certainly have been granted.300 The precise formulation varies by circuit (see § 5.7.2, Prejudice Standard below). Statutory rescission for counsel-caused nonappearance has a distinct prejudice inquiry; the Fifth and Ninth Circuits do not require a separate merits-prejudice showing in that setting.301 See § 4.7.1 for the procedural and circuit qualifications.
v. Prima Facie Case for Underlying Relief.
When reopening is sought to pursue relief that counsel failed to present, establish prima facie eligibility with supporting evidence. The IJ and Board regulations require the appropriate application and supporting documentation to accompany a motion to reopen for the purpose of acting on an application for relief. This is not a full merits adjudication. For an omitted asylum application, submit the completed I-589 and evidence supporting the claim. Statutory rescission does not impose a separate merits-eligibility prerequisite; see § 4.7.1.302
vi. Numerical Eligibility.
The motion counts against the one-motion limit under INA § 240(c)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) unless an exception applies.303 Review prior motions and the route-specific exceptions in §§ 2.4.1–2.4.2. Deadline tolling does not itself resolve a number bar: § 2.4.3 addresses Matter of M-M-L-J- and governing circuit law. A request for discretionary own-motion reopening is a separate route under Chapter 8, not an additional statutory motion entitlement.
5.3 Strategic Risk Assessment: When NOT to File
Even where the threshold gates are technically satisfied, evaluate the following red flags before investing time in the filing. Each identifies a condition that can defeat an otherwise-eligible claim.
Red Flag 1 — The “Tactical Decision” Defense. If the government or IJ will characterize prior counsel’s choices as strategic rather than deficient, your motion is at risk even if the strategy was terrible. Courts reject IAC claims based on hindsight criticism of tactical choices within the range of competent representation — including evidentiary strategy, questioning style, or argument emphasis.304 The line falls where counsel’s choice had no objectively reasonable basis in law or fact. Pursuing a legal theory foreclosed by binding authority crosses the line; choosing one viable theory over another generally does not. Before filing, explain why counsel’s choice was objectively unreasonable in light of the facts, law, engagement, and instructions at the time. Use relevant authority and the case record to explain why the conduct was unreasonable under governing law; do not make the analysis turn solely on locating a decision involving the identical tactic.
Red Flag 2 — Unexplained Post-Discovery Delay. Unexplained delay after discovery of counsel’s error can defeat equitable tolling. Also address diligence before the error was or should have been discovered.305 The Ninth Circuit’s Perez-Camacho v. Garland upheld denial of equitable tolling where the petitioner waited 21 years after conviction—13 years after the final removal order—to seek modification based on alleged IAC. He provided no basis to find reasonable efforts to pursue relief and no explanation for the exceedingly long delay.306 The Third Circuit’s Ragbir v. United States held, for purposes of coram nobis timeliness, that a petitioner’s “pursuit of administrative remedies cannot constitute a sound reason for delay” where a collateral challenge could have been pursued concurrently and the immigration relief sought depended on that challenge.307 In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit found a delay of roughly one year after denial of a petition for review insufficiently diligent — and a special concurrence argued the majority’s approach effectively required “maximum feasible diligence” by demanding simultaneous pursuit of judicial and administrative remedies.308
PRACTICE NOTE: Although there is no fixed outer limit on how long after discovery an IAC claim may be raised, adjudicators routinely deny tolling where there is extended, unexplained delay. IAC-based motions are most persuasive when filed promptly after discovery — commonly within days or weeks, not months or years. Where substantial delay exists, document every reason for it with contemporaneous evidence. If the delay is too long to credibly support tolling, consider framing IAC as an alternative or preservation argument rather than the primary reopening theory. An alternative or preservation label does not excuse the theory’s independent time, number, or compliance requirements.
Red Flag 3 — Same Counsel at IJ and BIA (Exhaustion Catch-22). Where the same attorney represented the respondent before both the immigration judge and the BIA, the respondent ordinarily had no realistic opportunity to raise the attorney’s ineffectiveness before the agency — yet an ineffective-assistance claim ordinarily must first be presented to the Board. INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), is a nonjurisdictional exhaustion rule; distinguish exhaustion of remedies available as of right from the obligation to present the IAC issue to the agency. The Seventh Circuit confronted this problem in Bustos-Millan v. Garland. Because the petitioners had not raised ineffective assistance before the Board, the court held it could not consider the claim, while acknowledging that the rule “creates something of a catch-22” where the same counsel appeared at both levels and observing that “equitable considerations might militate in favor of an exception to the exhaustion requirement.” That observation is dictum; the court created no exception and declined to reach the unexhausted IAC claim. Where the same attorney appeared at both levels, present the ineffective-assistance claim to the Board first — ordinarily through a motion to reopen filed by new counsel — and, if the government asserts a failure to exhaust on judicial review, argue for an equitable exception while acknowledging that Bustos-Millan did not recognize one. Do not rely on that possibility instead of making a timely agency presentation.309
Red Flag 4 — Strict Lozada Jurisdictions Without a Disciplinary Complaint. Failure to file a complaint may be excused by an adequate explanation, but an unexplained omission is ordinarily fatal.310 Evaluate any explanation under governing circuit law and the purposes of Lozada. Prior counsel’s death or disbarment may provide a valid explanation; neither is an automatic exception. Counsel’s admission alone is insufficient under Melgar. Do not assume suspension, inability to locate counsel, reluctance, or asserted futility excuses nonfiling. For unauthorized preparers, apply § 5.7.6 rather than treating nonattorney status as an automatic complaint exception.311
Red Flag 5 — Supplemental Filings Treated as Separate Motions. The BIA held in Matter of D-E-B- that a supplemental filing raising claims fundamentally different from those in the original motion is treated as a separate motion, subject to its own filing requirements — including the time and number limits.312 The original motion asserted IAC and changed personal circumstances; a later supplement alleged abuse and sought VAWA reopening. The Board treated those fundamentally different claims as a separate motion. Include available grounds in the original filing where feasible. Before supplementing, determine whether the filing supports an existing claim or presents a fundamentally different one, and address the filing rules and any exception applicable to a separate motion. A shared factual background is not a safe harbor.
Red Flag 6 — The First Circuit Equitable Tolling Gap. As of this writing, the First Circuit has not definitively decided whether equitable tolling applies to the 90-day MTR statutory deadline. The First Circuit has assumed without deciding that the deadline is tollable and has described equitable tolling as a rare remedy reserved for unusual circumstances.313 In the First Circuit, frame any tolling argument with heightened care and address the absence of binding authority directly — address both availability and the governing diligence and extraordinary-circumstance requirements.
Red Flag 7 — No Constitutional Right in the Eighth Circuit. Do not frame IAC as a constitutional claim in the Eighth Circuit — this circuit does not recognize a right to effective counsel in removal proceedings. The Eighth Circuit rejects a freestanding constitutional right to effective retained counsel and applies the statutory, regulatory, and Lozada reopening framework. When a complaint is asserted, it requires proof of submission or an adequate explanation for nonfiling; national BIA precedent now likewise requires the filed complaint and proof, or an explanation (see § 5.4 below; see also the Failure Point “Disciplinary Complaint Filed but No Proof Retained” below).314 If you are litigating an IAC motion in the Eighth Circuit, adjust both the legal framework and the evidentiary package accordingly.
PRACTICE NOTE: Alternative Grounds Strategy
Where the case qualifies for statutory or regulatory exceptions to time or numerical limits — changed country conditions, VAWA, lack of notice — consider whether IAC should be the primary theory or an alternative ground. A genuinely independent ground may avoid IAC-specific compliance disputes. Asserting IAC as an alternative still requires addressing its own procedural, prejudice, time, and number rules; the pleading order does not cure a defective IAC claim. Assess whether the benefits of asserting IAC as the primary theory outweigh the procedural and evidentiary risks, particularly where alternative grounds are legally stronger or procedurally cleaner.
Red Flag 8 — Document Preparers Who Did Not Hold Out as Attorneys. In Matter of Z-R-C-N-, 29 I&N Dec. 523 (BIA 2026), the Board rejected an ineffective-assistance claim involving a document preparer who neither was an attorney nor held himself out as one.315 The decision did not address an authorized accredited representative accurately identifying that role. Determine the person’s actual authorization and representations before applying the preparer rule.
Notes
- 288.
- Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988). Circuits apply variations of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), prejudice standard. Compare Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 2007) (“reasonable likelihood” the outcome would have been different), with Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (requiring a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome would have been different). See also Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the presumption of prejudice arising when counsel’s failure caused the loss of BIA appellate review was rebutted where the petitioner lacked “plausible grounds for relief”).
- 289.
- See § 5.7.3, Constitutional Right to Effective Counsel, below. Guandique-de Romero v. Bondi, 150 F.4th 332, 342–47 (4th Cir. 2025) (recognizing a Fifth Amendment right to effective retained counsel); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a freestanding constitutional right). For the Seventh Circuit’s conflicting approaches, see § 5.7.3 and its cited authorities.
- 290.
- INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). For comprehensive treatment of filing deadlines, numerical limits, and jurisdictional prerequisites, see Chapter 2 (Universal Motion Requirements).
- 291.
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649–50, 653 (2010); Matter of Morales-Morales, 28 I&N Dec. 714, 716–18 (BIA 2023) (Board appeals); Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2008) (diligence before and after actual or constructive discovery).
- 292.
- Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 225, 227–28 (2020); Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 221–25 (2024); Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 544–45, 550 (2026).
- 293.
- Morales-Morales, 28 I&N Dec. at 716–18 (overruling Matter of Liadov, 23 I&N Dec. 990 (BIA 2006)).
- 294.
- Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988). The Third Circuit has excused the complaint requirement where prior counsel unequivocally admitted the error, supplied evidence confirming it, and assisted in remediation. Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155–58 (3d Cir. 2007). This exception is circuit-specific.
- 295.
- Matter of L-R-M-C- & V-A-M-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 757, 759–61 (BIA 2026).
- 296.
- Gutierrez-Mikan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 163 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2026).
- 297.
- Jiang v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that counsel did not render ineffective assistance by reasonably recommending withdrawal of questionable asylum and withholding claims in favor of voluntary departure); Mena-Flores v. Holder, 776 F.3d 1152, 1169 (10th Cir. 2015) (“An attorney’s objectively reasonable tactical decisions do not qualify as ineffective assistance.”).
- 298.
- E.g., Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 882–83 (2d Cir. 1994) (failure to file § 212(c) application despite eligibility and clear instructions); Lo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 934, 936–39 (9th Cir. 2003) (failure to appear caused by counsel’s office affirmatively misinforming the clients of their hearing date was ineffective assistance constituting an “exceptional circumstance” requiring rescission of the in absentia removal order); id. at 937 n.4 (“We seldom reject ineffective assistance of counsel claims solely on the basis of Lozada deficiencies.”); Li v. Bondi, 139 F.4th 1113, 1116, 1121–24 (9th Cir. 2025) (requiring a reasoned agency response to a claim based on failure to file the court-of-appeals opening brief).
- 299.
- Matter of Melgar, 28 I&N Dec. 169, 171 (BIA 2020).
- 300.
- Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2008) (assessing whether counsel’s deficient performance may have affected the outcome and whether the underlying claims were plausible enough to warrant consideration on remand).
- 301.
- Galvez-Vergara v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 798, 803 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007); Lo, 341 F.3d at 939 n.6; Sanchez Rosales v. Barr, 980 F.3d 716, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2020); cf. Matter of Rivera-Claros, 21 I&N Dec. 599, 603 n.1 (BIA 1996) (former statutory rescission framework).
- 302.
- 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104–05 (1988) (identifying independent grounds for denying reopening). For statutory rescission, E.A.C.A. v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 499, 512 (6th Cir. 2021) (rejecting a separate requirement of prima facie eligibility for relief).
- 303.
- INA § 240(c)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A).
- 304.
- Jiang v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2008); Mena-Flores v. Holder, 776 F.3d 1152, 1169 (10th Cir. 2015).
- 305.
- Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2008); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679–80 (9th Cir. 2011); Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2011).
- 306.
- Perez-Camacho v. Garland, 54 F.4th 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2022).
- 307.
- Ragbir v. United States, 950 F.3d 54, 64 (3d Cir. 2020).
- 308.
- Point du Jour v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23-11630, slip op. at 5–10 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished) (applying Holland’s reasonable-diligence standard de novo to undisputed facts; assuming without deciding that the filing period was tolled until the decision that put the respondent on notice of appellate counsel’s deficiency, and holding that a delay of roughly one year — during which he pursued rehearing en banc and certiorari, followed by three unexplained months — did not constitute reasonable diligence, while expressly declining to decide whether to adopt the simultaneous-pursuit rule of Galvez-Pineda v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 833, 839 (10th Cir. 2005)); Point du Jour, No. 23-11630, slip op. at 5–7 (Geraghty, D.J., concurring specially) (characterizing the majority’s simultaneous-pursuit expectation as “maximum feasible diligence” rather than the “reasonable diligence” Holland requires); see also Thomas v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1162, 1179 (11th Cir. 2021) (de novo review of the application of equitable tolling law to undisputed facts). The concurrence, slip op. at 4–7, would have treated pursuit through judicial review as diligent but agreed the post-certiorari delay defeated the claim.
- 309.
- Bustos-Millan v. Garland, 111 F.4th 841, 848–49 (7th Cir. 2024). Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 423–25, 430–31 n.10 (2023) (holding that INA § 242(d)(1) is nonjurisdictional and does not require discretionary reconsideration; reserving broader issue-exhaustion questions).
- 310.
- Guzman-Torralva v. Garland, 22 F.4th 617, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2022) (respondent’s statement that he was “not interested” in filing a bar complaint held inadequate); Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1363 (10th Cir. 2004) (no entitlement to equitable tolling where the petitioner failed to satisfy the Lozada requirements).
- 311.
- Matter of Melgar, 28 I&N Dec. 169, 170–71 (BIA 2020).
- 312.
- Matter of D-E-B-, 29 I&N Dec. 83, 84, 88–89 (BIA 2025).
- 313.
- Gyamfi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 168, 174–75 (1st Cir. 2019); Kim v. Blanche, No. 24-2042, slip op. at 5–6 (1st Cir. July 30, 2026) (published) (continuing to reserve whether the 90-day limit is subject to equitable tolling).
- 314.
- Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008); Irias v. Bondi, 167 F.4th 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2026); Matter of L-R-M-C- & V-A-M-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 757, 760–61 (BIA 2026).
- 315.
- Z-R-C-N-, 29 I&N Dec. at 524–25; see also Jean Louis v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 914 F.3d 189, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2019) (following the bad advice of a person the petitioner believed to be a lawyer, but who did not hold himself out as such, does not constitute an exceptional circumstance for rescinding an in absentia removal order); Gunawan v. Gonzales, 132 F. App’x 997, 1000 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (distinguishing ineffective assistance of counsel from ineffective assistance by a nonattorney who never purported to be an attorney).
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